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Abstract 
Using a novel dataset with transactions level exports data from four African countries (Malawi, Mali, 
Senegal and Tanzania), this paper uncovers evidence of a high degree of experimentation at the 
extensive margin associated with low survival rates, consistent with high and middle income country 
evidence. Consequently, the authors focus on the questions of what determines success and survival 
beyond the first year and find that survival probability rises with the number of firms exporting the 
same product to the same destination from the same country, pointing towards the existence of cross-
firm synergies. Accordingly the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that those synergies may be 
driven by information spillovers. More intuitively and consistently with multi-product firms models, 
the analysis also finds that firms more diversified in terms of products, but even more in terms of 
markets, are more likely to be successful and survive beyond the first year. 
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In spite of great strides since the late 1990s, low-income country exports are
still marginal in world trade and suer from various vulnerabilities, ranging
from low unit values to volatility, concentration and low survival (see for
example Fugazza and Molina 2009). Low survival is not necessarily a sign
of welfare loss if it reects strong experimentation at the extensive margin,
but it can be inecient if sunk costs of entry and exit are substantial, as
suggested by the work of Das, Robert and Tybout (2007). In particular, the
weak contribution of the extensive margin to overall export growth (Besedes
and Prusa 2007) may be explained by high failure rates, the ip side of low
survival. Thus, identifying drivers of the `sustainability margin' of exports
is important for our understanding of the constraints to low-income country
export growth. This is what the present paper sets up to do, using a new
transaction-level export dataset obtained from Customs authorities in four
African countries.
The key contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we document, for a
sample of four low income African countries, a set of stylized facts on export
survival that is broadly consistent with the emerging rm-level literature, so
far conned to OECD or middle-income countries. Second, we provide novel
evidence on a key outcome of interest, namely survival beyond the rst year
after entry into export markets. In particular, we identify a cross-rm \syn-
ergy eect" suggestive of external economies in export survival, a potential
driver of sustainability that has been hitherto overlooked in the literature.
Increasing the number of exporters of similar products to the same destina-
tion exerts a positive externality on new entrants. That is, the more similar
they are, the higher the survival probability of new entrants. When evaluat-
ing the mechanisms behind these results we nd evidence consistent with the
existence of information spillovers driving them. For a Senegalese exporter,
for instance, the probability of surviving past the rst year (22% in 2001)
would rise to 26% if the number of national competitors selling the same
product (product identied at HS 6 digits) on the same destination market
were to double from the baseline 22 to 44.
Our results may help explain a nding highlighted in Easterly, Reshe
and Schwenkenberg (2009), namely, that national export success often takes
the form of `big hits', with one narrow export item suddenly growing rapidly.
2If a sucient number of exporters target one market simultaneously, our
results imply that their chances of surviving increase, possibly triggering a
virtuous cycle of entry, survival and growth.
Like Eaton et al. (2008), we also nd that export spells that survive tend
to grow. For instance, in Senegal, products that entered a market in 2001
and survived till 2008 had reached, by then, four times their entry volume.
Lastly, export scale and scope at the rm level, by which we mean respec-
tively destinations per product and products per destination, both evaluated
at the time the rm launches a new product-destination combination, matter
for its survival.
From a policy perspective, our ndings could be construed as contribut-
ing to a possible rationale for using public funds to promote national exports
abroad. The synergy we identify is akin to external economies, as the pres-
ence of competitors from the same countries exporting the same product to
the same destination provides potential new entrants with information on
the protability of these exports ventures, help identifying potential buyers
as well as provide information about the consumers' preferences and there-
fore increases their likelihood of surviving. Similarly, this information be-
comes available to nancial institutions and ease nancial constraints of new
exporters as shown by the fact that these `synergy eects' are especially
important for rms in sectors that are more dependent from the nancial
sector. However, these external economies may not be fully internalized by
exporters as incumbents have not sucient incentives to explicitly assist new
entrants, leading to a market failure. Public intervention, in the form of ex-
port promotion, through market-product specic information and \matching
with buyers" services, could possibly help overcome these market failures, al-
though the record of publicly-nanced export promotion is patchy, especially
in developing countries (see Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton 2010), and the
eects we identify even if statistically robust are quantitatively small.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the recent liter-
ature related to this paper. Section 3 presents qualitative evidence based
on a recent survey of African exporters conducted by the World Bank that
motivates the consequent analysis and presents a brief description of the
data. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy and the result, Section 5
3concludes.
2 Export survival: What do we know?
At the product level, the determinants of export survival have been ex-
plored by a small but growing literature. Besedes and Prusa (2006) used two
panels of U.S. imports, one spanning 1972-88 with tari-schedule data, the
other spanning the 1989-2001 period with 10-digit data (the Feenstra-NBER
dataset). In both cases, they found that half of all trade relationships lasted
only one year and three quarters lasted three years or less. Once censoring
was taken into account, median duration was two years. Most strikingly, this
pattern of short duration was robust to aggregation at HS6, even though one
would expect interruptions to be smoothed out by aggregation. They also
found negative duration dependence, meaning that the hazard rate fell as
export spells grew older. This nding, however, has been recently contested
by Brenton, Saborowsky and von Uexhull (2010).1 In terms of survival de-
terminants, Besedes and Prusa (2006) found that industrial-country exports
lasted longer, and so did exports of machinery, a nding conrmed by the
analysis of Asian trade ows by Obashi (2010).
Besedes and Prusa (2006) explored the determinants of export survival
further by testing the implications of a search model proposed by Rauch and
Watson (2003) in which importers search for low-cost suppliers and exporters
invest optimally in production capacity in the face of moral hazard (risk of
non-payment). Such model implies that, in general, smaller initial trans-
actions have a lower life expectancy; however, dierentiated goods, where
moral hazard is highest, involve both smaller initial transactions and longer
life expectancy. The model's predictions are upheld by Cox regressions on
U.S. import data using Rauch's (1999) index of product dierentiation as a
regressor. That is, the hazard rate is 23% higher for homogenous products
than for dierentiated ones, although initial transactions are 40% to 350%
larger. In related work, Besedes (2008) also nds supports for the Rauch-
1Brenton et al. argue that the assumption of proportional hazards, which is needed for
Cox regressions to be valid, typically does not hold in export-duration samples (this can be
veried using a Sch onfeld test). Using the alternative Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) estimator,
they nd no duration dependence. Brenton et al.'s critique applies to the quasi-entirety
of the export-survival literature.
4Watson hypotheses on a restricted sample of Rauch-dierentiated products
where he proxies search costs by the number of potential suppliers and reli-
ability by income levels.
Evidence on trade ows from other countries largely conrmed these early
ndings. The determinants of export duration were explored by Nitsch (2009)
using Cox regressions on a ten-year panel of German imports at the HS8 level.
He found that gravity variables (distance, exporter GDP, common language,
common border, etc.) inuenced the duration of trade ows pretty much
the same way they inuenced trade volumes. Interestingly, he found that
the short duration of trade ows held even when ows below 10'000 euros
were excluded. Fugazza and Molina (2009) extended the exploration to a
nine-year panel of HS6 bilateral trade ows between 96 countries using, as
regressors, gravity variables and time required for export procedures (based
on the World Bank's Doing Business surveys) as proxies for xed costs. Be-
sides usual ndings on the eect of gravity variables and income levels, they
also found that xed costs reduced survival.2 A similar exercise was carried
out on Asian trade ows by Obashi (2010) with largely convergent results. In
particular, the 2-to-3 year median survival seems to hold across all samples
studied. Obashi also found that vertical trade relationships (involving the
sale of semi-nished product) have hazard rates one-third lower than those
involving the sale of nal goods, and that they are less sensitive to trade
costs (e.g. distance or exchange-rate uctuations).
A smaller number of recent papers have made use of the growing avail-
ability of rm-level datasets to shed new light on the determinants of export
survival. For instance, G org et al. (2008) tested the implications of the
heterogeneous-rm model of Bernard et al. (2006) on a rich panel of 2,043
Hungarian rms spanning the transition from centrally-planned to market
economy (1992-2003). Their data contained rm characteristics and exports
at the rm-HS6 level. They found large product turnover during the period as
rms constantly rearranged their product portfolios. They also found longer
survival for products located close to the rm's core competencies and to the
country's comparative advantage. These results are consistent with those
2This is unintuitive: in microeconomics, the shut-down point depends on average vari-
able costs, not on xed costs. However the xed export costs they consider are incurred
for each transaction, although they do not depend on transaction size. They are therefore
not really xed when looking at ows aggregated to the annual level.
5of Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) who showed the importance of churning at
the rm level in response to exogenous opportunities provided by increased
globalization. Alvarez and L opez (2008) used Tobit regressions to study the
determinants of industry-level rates of entry and exit into exporting using
a 10-year panel of 5'000 Chilean plants. They found that within-industry
heterogeneity, measured (inter alia) by the dispersion of rm-level produc-
tivity levels, played an important role in explaining rm turnover in and
out of exporting. By contrast, trade costs, factor intensities, and exchange-
rate uctuations were found to have only marginal impacts. Carballo and
Volpe (2008) used a 6-year panel of rm-level Peruvian exports at the HS10
level to explore how diversication strategies (in terms of products and mar-
kets) aected the survival of rm-level exporting activity. They found that
both geographical and product-wise diversication raised survival, but geo-
graphical diversication more so|presumably because it proxies for product
quality.
3 Data
3.1 Qualitative evidence from a World Bank survey
Preliminary indications on how African exporters venture and survive (or
not) on foreign markets can be gleaned from a 2009 survey focusing on ex-
port survival conducted by the World Bank in four African countries.3 The
survey, which had three sections (basic information on the rm, constraints
on survival, and opportunities and plans for future expansion), asked ex-
porters specic questions on their initial entry into and survival on export
markets. On the basis of the information provided, respondents were clas-
sied into three categories: (i) current exporters, (ii) past exporters (who
failed), and (iii) intermittent exporters.
As shown by Table 7 in the appendix, roughly two thirds of the respon-
dents (a bit more among regular exporters) identied their rst client through
relatives, friends, intermediaries and suppliers. More formal or technology-
related channels (e.g. trade fairs or online research) came only second, and
3The countries are Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania. See Appendix 1 for more
background information on the survey.
6only a tenth of the initial contacts were made through export promotion
agencies or exporters' associations. This highlights the importance of infor-
mal networks and suggest that the \thickness" of a certain network where
there are many rms exporting similar countries to similar destination may
help to expand the chance of identifying appropriate buyers among through
contacts with relatives, friends, intermediaries and suppliers.4
Product experience, whether through domestic or foreign sales, appears
as a strong driver of geographical export expansion. A majority of respon-
dents reported that their initial export product was one they were already
selling domestically, as opposed to starting a new line taylored to the for-
eign customer's needs. This suggests that experience matters and indirectly,
it also could imply a natural 3-step expansion strategy: rst the domestic
market, then regional markets with similar preferences (so domestically sold
products can be tried there), nally more dierentiated markets. This is con-
sistent with results in Cadot, Carr ere and Strauss-Kahn (2009) who showed
that the survival of LDC exports was higher when export to OECD markets
was preceded by a small number of years of exports to regional markets.
Moreover, when asked whether their most recent export product in a given
destination was a new one or one that had previously been exported else-
where, respondents overwhelmingly indicated the latter.
When asked how the opportunity to export a new product came about
in the rst place, the majority of regular exporters answered that they were
approached by an existing buyer asking for a new product, suggesting that
export experience matters beyond domestic experience in terms of establish-
ing a \network" of buyers to identify market opportunities.
Finally, in an open question about constraints on export (or export expan-
sion in the case of the current exporters), a large proportion of respondents
(31%) identied access to nance as the main factor limiting their operations.
Moreover, the percentage was higher (42%) among past (failed) exporters,
suggesting that credit constraints are not just a perception, but a reality
eectively hurting the survival of exports.
4The role of networks for trade is a theme largely developed in the writings of Rauch
(1999)
73.2 Customs data
Our export dataset is generated from raw data les collected by customs
authorities containing export ows at the transaction level. The les were
provided by the customs authorities of Malawi, Mali, Senegal and Tanza-
nia. Each of them contains information on products exported at the highest
level of disaggregation of the HS code used by these administrations: 10-digit
for Mali and Senegal and 8-digit for Malawi and Tanzania. In addition to
product information, each le contains information on destination market,
FOB shipment value, net weight, port used and date of transaction. Original
names and tax IDs identifying the individual rm were replaced by `dummy'
digital IDs so as to preserve condentiality. We aggregated transactions up
to annual totals at the 6-digit level, the standard level used in cross-country
comparisons. Finally, for consistency, we ltered out years with dierent port
coverage. For instance, for Malawi we have information from 2004 onward;
however, as fewer ports were covered in 2004 than in other years, we ex-
cluded 2004 from our sample for that country. Sample periods are 2005-2008
for Malawi and Mali, 2000-2008 for Senegal, and 2003-2008 for Tanzania.
Table 1 presents some basic descriptive statistics. Tanzania has the
largest number of exporters (1,359), followed by Malawi (856), Senegal (715),
and Mali (280); however, they are less diversied than those of other coun-
tries in our sample in terms of markets. Mali's exporters are, on average, the
most diversied in terms of products.
Our variables of interests are indexed as follows. Let f be a rm, d a
destination, p a product (at HS6), t the starting year of an export spell, and
vc
fpdt the dollar value of exports of product p to destination d in calendar year
t by rm f from country c. Because there are no multi-country rms in our
sample, indexing observations by rm eliminates the need to index them by
origin country. We aggregate transactions to annual (f;p;d;t) quartets, our
primary sample unit.
8Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Nr rms Nr prod. Nr dest. Nr prod/rm Nr dest/rm Nr rms/prod Nr rms/dest Init. value (USD)
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Mali 280 575 99 2.54 2 3.89 2 1.89 1 7.18 2 219,694 5,373
Malawi 856 932 102 1.57 1 4.10 2 3.76 1 13.19 3 106,475 571
Senegal 715 1,653 100 3.10 1 6.76 2 2.92 2 22.17 5 47,111 3,446
Tanzania 1,359 1,689 137 2.49 1 3.62 1 2.91 1 24.69 7 83,078 2,858
This table shows, for each source country: The number of rms, products, destinations, the number of products per rm,
number of destination per rm, number of rms per product, number of rms per destination and the value of those rms
that entered the export market. All values are computed for the year 2006.
9Before turning to survival analysis (next section), a few observations are
important. Following the literature on the intensive and extensive margins
(e.g. Evenett and Venables 2003 or Brenton and Newfarmer 2007), we group
our primary sample units into new rms, new products (for existing rms),
new destinations (for existing rm-products), and continuing rm-product-
destinations. Items labeled `new' refer to units that are present in the data
at time t but not at time t   1.5 These groupings create four mutually ex-
clusive categories. The `new-rm' category includes all product-destination
combinations served at time t by an exporter appearing in the data in that
year (except the rst year). The `new-product' category includes all product-
destination combinations served at time t by an existing exporter |one that
already exported at t   1| who did not export that product anywhere at
t   1. The `new-destination' category includes all product-destination com-
binations served at time t by an existing exporter who did not serve that
destination with any product at t   1. The `existing product-destination'
category includes all product-destination combinations served at time t by
an exporter who was also serving that product-destination at t   1. More
formally, let vf;t 1 stand for f's exports of any product to any destination
at t   1, vfp;t 1 for its exports of product p to any destination, vfd;t 1 for its
exports of any product to destination d, vfpd;t 1 for its exports of product p
to destination d. Our four categories are
NF = f(f;p;d;t)s.t.vfpdt > 0 and vf;t 1 = 0g;
NP = f(f;p;d;t)s.t.vfpdt > 0;vf;t 1 > 0 and vfp;t 1 = 0g;
ND = f(f;p;d;t)s.t.vfpdt > 0;vf;t 1 > 0 and vfd;t 1 = 0g;
EPD = f(f;p;d;t)s.t.vfpdt > 0 and vfpd;t 1 > 0g:
The dollar value of export sales in the rst three categories can only go from
zero at t   1 to some positive value at t; these variations add up to the ex-
tensive margin. Changes in the dollar value of exports in the last category
form the intensive margin.
Figure 1 decomposes the exports ows into these four categories both in
terms of their number, i.e. count of trade ows, and value.
5Observations in the sample period's initial year are considered left-censored and not
used.
10Figure 1: Decomposition of exports ows
Note: This graph classies each of the origin-rm-product-destination observations into one of four mutually exclusive groups: New Destination
includes units of existing rms which export an existing product to a new destination; New Products includes existing rms that add a product
to their portfolio, New Firms includes all units from rms that did not export before, while Continued includes all other units. The rst set
of graphs displays the share of observations, and the second set the share of total values of each category.
1
1Analyzing the export values, existing products sold in existing destina-
tions (i.e. observations for which rm, destination and HS6 at time t are all
the same as they were at time t-1) dominate in dollar value, although not
always in the count of observations. For example, in Tanzania, continued
rm-product-destinations accounted for 90 percent of export value in 2006
but only for 25% of the observation count. This suggests that our coun-
tries experiment substantially. This fact is consistent with the ndings of
Cadot, Carriere and Strauss-Kahn (2010) for low-income countries, Freund
and Pierola (2010) for Peru and Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) for Mexico.
Continuing rm product destinations make up a relatively small number of
export transactions, but a large share of export values. This conrms the
ndings of Besedes and Prusa (2007) and Brenton and Newfarmer (2007),
who also show the importance of the intensive margin in explaining export
growth in developing countries (see also Evenett and Venables 2002).
Another interesting stylized fact, consistent with existing rm-level lit-
erature modeling exporters dynamics (Rauch and Watson 2003), conrms
that when a rm's product manages to survive in a given destination market
beyond its rst year, it will grow signicantly over time. Conditional on sur-
vival, Senegalese rm-product-destinations that appeared in 2001 (we don't
know the initial year of those appearing in 2000, the sample's initial year,
because they are censored) grew by a factor of over four between 2001 and
2008. Similarly, Tanzanian rm-product-destinations that appeared in 2005
grew by a factor of over three by 2008.
Following Brooks (2006), Table 2 shows the number of rms, rm-products,
and rm-product-destinations by a given year of entry and tracks the sur-
vival of this cohort over time for each origin country. Naturally, the numbers
decrease because of the exit. What is remarkable, however, is how large the
attrition is in the rst year and how quickly it slows down over time. For
instance, in Senegal, of the 206 rms that started exporting in 2001, only
84 made it to 2002 (a death rate of 59%); however, of the 24 still around in
2007, only 3 had failed by 2008 (a death rate of \just" 12%). To make this
point more clear, the third column of Table 2, calculated from the second
one, shows the survival rate with respect to the previous year (i.e. one minus
the annual death rate). Survival rates increase over time. For instance, 59
percent of rms that entered in 2001 dropped out by 2002, while 13 percent
of rms that survived until 2007 survive also until 2008. This casual obser-
12Table 2: Survival cohorts
Senegal Tanzania Mali Malawi
Entry:2001 Entry:2004 Entry:2005 Entry:2005
Nr Y-Exit Exit Nr Y-Exit Exit Nr Y-Exit Exit Nr Y-Exit Exit
Firm
2001 206
2002 84 0.59 0.59
2003 57 0.32 0.72
2004 40 0.30 0.81 420
2005 35 0.13 0.83 194 0.54 0.54 273 670
2006 29 0.17 0.86 118 0.39 0.72 159 0.42 0.42 217 0.68 0.68
2007 24 0.17 0.88 85 0.28 0.80 123 0.23 0.55 154 0.29 0.77
2008 21 0.13 0.90 75 0.12 0.82 103 0.16 0.62 126 0.18 0.81
Product
2001 2055
2002 449 0.78 0.78
2003 192 0.57 0.91
2004 117 0.39 0.94 2656
2005 94 0.20 0.95 497 0.81 0.81 1047 3322
2006 78 0.17 0.96 200 0.60 0.92 305 0.71 0.71 325 0.90 0.90
2007 61 0.22 0.97 106 0.47 0.96 166 0.46 0.84 174 0.46 0.95
2008 54 0.11 0.97 71 0.33 0.97 123 0.26 0.88 127 0.27 0.96
Product destinations
2001 3326
2002 718 0.78 0.78
2003 356 0.50 0.89
2004 245 0.31 0.93 4908
2005 167 0.32 0.95 837 0.83 0.83 1391 3828
2006 129 0.23 0.96 295 0.65 0.94 286 0.79 0.79 509 0.87 0.87
2007 101 0.22 0.97 167 0.43 0.97 122 0.57 0.91 316 0.38 0.92
2008 84 0.17 0.97 113 0.32 0.98 82 0.33 0.94 224 0.29 0.94
Note: In the columns labelled Nr we document for each origin country the number of rms
products and destinations in the rst available year, and follow this cohort of units over
time. Column Y-Exit shows the exit rate (ie. the share of units that left) with respect to
the previous year, and column Exit the exit rate with respect to the entry year.
13vation is consistent with Besedes and Prusa's decreasing-hazard rate nding
(annual death rates are discrete-time approximations to instantaneous hazard
rates) although, as noted, this nding must be taken cautiously. Comparing
the upper panel (rms) with middle and lower ones (products and product-
destinations respectively), there is less stability at more disaggregate levels.
Additionally, the fourth column shows cumulative death rates relative to
the rst year. In all cases these rates are high, and above 80% in 2008 in
most cases (with the only exception of Mali at the rm level). In all four
countries, the very high death rates after the rst year suggest that a binary
coding of survival based on second-year outcomes is a good summary mea-
sure of survival.
Overall, the results presented in Figure 1 and Table 2 suggest that there
is substantial churning in export products and destinations within rms; in
other words, rms continuously experiment with products and destinations.
Thus, Hausman and Rodrik's `self-discovery' process (Hausman and Rodrik
2003) seems to hold not only at the national level, but also|quite naturally|
at the rm level. This pattern is also consistent with the notion that rms
face uncertainty about export costs or demand parameters, a notion that is
central to the heterogeneous-rms literature.
In sum, the preliminary evidence presented above conrms existing nd-
ings about export growth and survival: a) the intensive margin represents
the largest share of export growth in terms of values, however these values
are concentrated over a small number of transactions and rms; b) there is
substantial experimentation in the exporting activity in the form of entry by
new rms or the introduction of new products or destinations each year; c)
one-year survival rates are low; past the rst year, death rates signicantly
slow down and transaction volumes grow.
4 Estimation strategy and results
4.1 Estimation strategy
After aggregating the transactions to cumulated annual totals, the primary
sample remains a panel, as each rm-product-destination (f;p;d) triplet is
14observed repeatedly over several years. However, as we are interested in the
survival past the rst year, the data needs to undertake a second transfor-
mation. We dene a new (f;p;d;t) quartet as one that appears for the rst
time in the database, and say that this quartet `survives' if it lasts more than
one year. The quartet is then associated to a survival dummy (our depen-
dent variable) equal to one. If it lasts only one year, the survival dummy is
set equal to zero for that quartet. If it has already appeared in the sample
or if it is left-censored (i.e. already active the rst year of the sample), we
drop it. Multiple spells account for only a very small number of observations,
since our sample periods are only a few years except for Senegal. Thus, we
reduce our panel to a quasi-cross-section, even though each observation has
an initial-year tag allowing us to control for calendar time. Doing so allows
us to bypass the issue of how long a spell break should be to be considered
a `death', an issue that has been discussed at length in the survival liter-
ature and that has no clear-cut answer. Two additional reasons make this
binary denition of survival attractive. First, our panels are too short to
carry out a full-edged survival analysis. Second, as the descriptive analysis
above showed, once a rm has survived the rst year, its survival probabil-
ity dramatically increases; so understanding survival beyond the rst year is
especially important.6
As already noted, rm and country indices are redundant, so we use
either a country superscript c or a rm subscript f, but not both, and run




1 ifvfpdt > 0;vfpd;t ` = 0 8 ` > 0;andvfpd;t+1 > 0
0 ifvfpdt > 0;vfpd;t ` = 0 8 ` > 0;andvfpd;t+1 = 0: (1)
In 1, the expression \8 ` > 0" means \over the sample period" as a single
spell over the sample period could be a multiple one over an (unobserved)
longer sample. The estimating equation is
6This choice comes with both a cost and a benet. On one hand, we lose information,
as a two-year spell is treated as equivalent to a 3- or 4-year one; on the other hand, we gain
robustness, as the probability of wrongly treating a two-or-more year spell as a one-year
one is fairly low.
7We also ran, for robustness, separate regressions by origin country. The results of
these regressions are available upon request. They are qualitatively similar to those of
cross-country (pooled) regressions reported here.
15Pr(sfpdt = 1) = (xfpdt + i + cd + t + ufpdt) (2)
where  is the probit function and ufpdt is an error term. Our specication in-
cludes industry xed eects at HS2 (i), origin-destination xed eects (cd),
and spell-start year xed eects (t). The vector of regressors xfpdt includes
measures of the rm's scale and scope as well as proxies for agglomeration
and market attractiveness. These proxies are counts of (i) nc
pdt, the number
of rms from origin country c exporting product p to destination d; (ii) nfpt,
the number of destinations to which rm f exports product p; (iii) nfdt, the
number of products that rm f exports to destination d; (iv) nc
dt, the num-
ber of (product  rm) combinations active in the bilateral trade between
origin c and destination d; they also include (v) vfpdt, the initial value of
rm f's export spell (product p to destination d); and (vi) zfp, the share of
product p in rm f's overall export sales. That is, the notation convention
is to omit the index of the dimension over which the count is summed. All
counts are put in logs, and we use robust standard errors clustered at the
product-destination level throughout.
In customs data, E.U. countries are entered as separate destinations
rather than as a whole. We have kept this convention, so a destination
should be taken, as far as the E.U. is concerned, as a member state. This
creates an asymmetry in the treatment of destinations between the U.S.,
which is taken as a whole, and the E.U., which is broken down. However,
as African exports tend to be heavily concentrated on E.U. markets, the al-
ternative assumption (bundling all E.U. destinations together) would have
drastically reduced the number of destinations and potentially obfuscated
some geographical diversication issues, as marketing channels are, in spite
of the Single Market, still somewhat separate across E.U. member states.
We estimate equation 2 by probit, reporting marginal eects. Typically,
marginal eects of a probit estimation can be interpreted like the coecient
in a linear probability model, and also in the present case a robustness check
reveals that quantitatively the dierence between the results from a linear
probability model and the probit's marginal eects at the mean are very
small.8
8Results of a comparison of the linear probability model and Probit estimates are
available upon request.
164.2 Baseline results
Baseline regression results are shown in Table 3. Before turning to their
detailed interpretation, it is important to stress that the eects to be dis-
cussed are simultaneously present in each regression and so are conditional
on each other. Also, it is important to note that these must be interpreted
as conditional on starting to export. The probability of survival beyond the
rst year t can be estimated only for those trade ows that started at t   1,
so we exclude left-censored spells (those already active at the start of the
sample) and multiple ones.9 The rst column presents the baseline results.
The second diers from the rst in that all right-hand side (RHS) variables
are lagged by one year. The third and the fourth include one additional
control each, the share of product p in rm f's export portfolio in the third
and origin country c's revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in product p
in the fourth. The fth runs a counterfactual experiment which is discussed
below.
Consider rst the results in Column (1). The rst regressor of interest is
lnnc
pdt, the log of the number of rms selling the same product (p) in the same
destination (d). That is, if spell (f;p;d;t) is mens' t-shirts sold in France
by a Senegalese rm in 2006, lnnc
pdt is the log of the number of Senegalese
rms exporting mens' t-shirts in France in 2006. The eect is positive and
signicant at the 1% level in all specications. That is, more companies from
the same country selling the same product in the same destination together
raise each other's survival probability. This is a striking network eect, to
which we will come back at some length later on. How large is the eect?
Let us write the probability of survival as fpdt = Pr(sfpdt = 1). Recalling
that the coecients reported in Table 3 are marginal eects, using the point
estimate of of 0.0566 in the rst cell of Column (1), and the average number
of Senegalese rms selling to each destination (nSEN
pdt = 22) we can write
9The number of multiple spells is very limited and their inclusion does not inuence
our results.
17Table 3: Determinants of survival past the rst year
Regressors (log) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
nc
pdt Firm count 0.0566*** 0.0431*** 0.0544*** 0.0563***
(0.00283) (0.00306) (0.00282) (0.00285)
n c
pdt Firm count 0.00449
(0.00727)
nfpt Dest. count 0.125*** 0.0820*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.116***
(0.00270) (0.00296) (0.00269) (0.0027) (0.00397)
nfdt Prod. count 0.0375*** 0.0224*** 0.0478*** 0.0375*** 0.0301***
(0.00163) (0.00152) (0.00184) (0.00163) (0.00218)
vfpdt Init. value 0.0304*** 0.0332*** 0.0277*** 0.0304*** 0.0335***
(0.000898) (0.000889) (0.000921) (0.000898) (0.00125)
nc
dt Prod.  rm -0.00477 -0.0213*** -0.00723 -0.00472 -0.00131
(0.00594) (0.00397) (0.00595) (0.00594) (0.0084)




RHS vars lagged No Yes No No No
HS2 FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin-dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 57,063 57,063 57,063 57,063 11,185
Note: Probit estimations, marginal eects reported. Origin-destination, hs2 and year xed
eects. Robust standard errors clustered by origin-destination-product.
18fpdt = 0:0566 [ln(n
c
pdt + 1)   ln(n
c
pdt)]
= 0:0566 [ln(23)   ln(22)] (3)
= 0:0025:
Using the illustrative attrition rates in Table 2, a Senegalese rm entering in
2001 has a rst-year attrition rate of 0.78 (78%) at the product-destination
spell level, implying a survival probability of 0.22. We take this number as
our baseline probability of survival, fpdt. Raising it by 0.0025 means a neg-
ligible increase of 0.2 percentage points. Doubling the number of national
competitors on a given product-destination niche, from the baseline of 22 to
44, would raise the rst-year survival probability by 3.9 percentage points,
from 0.22 to 0.26 (a proportional increase of 18%).
Skipping the second regressor which is a placebo used in Column (5) and
discussed later on, the second regressor in Column (1) is lnnfpt, the count
of destinations to which product p is exported by rm f, a proxy for the
scale at which the rm exports, and thus probably produces, product p.
Scale signicantly raises the probability of survival in all regressions. This
may reect either more robust production lines (say, a larger number of
machines, meaning that failure of one of them is more easily made up by
others), better information about the cross-country drivers of a product's
demand, or, alternatively, higher product quality. How large is the eect?
Using a calculation similar to that in (3), an additional destination10 raises
the probability of survival by
fpdt = 0:125 [ln(2:55)   ln(1:55)] = 0:062:
That is, the baseline rst-year probability of survival of a spell goes up by
6.2 percentage points, from 0.22 to 0.28, when the mean Senegalese exporter
adds one destination to his portfolio at the product level. If she was to double
the number of his destinations for that product, the rst-year survival prob-
ability would rise by 8.7 percentage points, from 0.22 to 0.31 (a proportional
rise of 39%).
10The average number of destinations per product, for a Senegalese rm, is 1.55. This
is lower than the number appearing in Table 1 which is the total number of destinations
per rm, not per rm-product.
19The next regressor, lnnfdt, is the log of the number of products rm f
exports to destination d, a proxy for its `scope' in that destination. The ef-
fect is, again, positive and signicant. As for its magnitude, if our Senegalese
rm adds one product to its average destination d, from a baseline of 3.48
products,11 the usual calculation gives a rise of just 1 percentage point in the
survival probability. With a doubling of the number of products, the survival
probability rises by 2.5 percentage points, from 0.22 to 0.245, a proportional
rise of 11%.
Thus, adding one product to a given destination has a smaller eect on
spell survival (1 percentage point) than adding an additional destination
for that product (1.7 percentage point). This is somewhat natural, as our
analysis is at a disaggregated level in terms of products (5,000 products at
HS6), so the additional product sold on destination d can be very close to
the original; by contrast, destination countries are much fewer, so adding
one more shipping destination for product p is a substantial move (although
it may involve adding one E.U. member state which would mean expanding
within the Single Market space). An alternative explanation goes as follows.
Increasing either scope or size raises the rm's visibility and therefore has
a positive demand eect. However, there may be supply eects running at
cross-purposes. When a rm adds one export destination to a given line
of products, it expands production, potentially making the value chain more
robust to accidental uctuations. By contrast, when it adds one product to a
destination, the rm diversies production and therefore spreads managerial
attention and risk management over a wider range of activities, potentially
resulting in more accidents. In that case, the supply eect runs against the
demand eect, resulting in a lower net change in spell survival.
The next regressor is a control for the export spell's initial value, vfpdt,
which has been shown to correlate with spell survival at the product (multi-
rm) level. This is conrmed at the rm level, although the eect is, again,
small. Using the coecient in Table 3 (0.0304), a doubling of the initial value
of the Senegalese rm's average export spell ($47'111 from Table 1) would
raise the probability of spell survival by 0.021, or 2 percentage points, from
0.22 to 0.241.
11Again, this number diers from the one appearing in Table 1, which is the total number
of products per rm, not per rm-destination.
20The last regressor, lnnc
dt, is a count of the rm-product pairs from coun-
try c active on destination d. If c is Senegal and one Senegalese rm sells
two HS6 products in the E.U. and another one sells three, nc
dt = 5 for all
ve observations with c = Senegal and d = E.U. in year t. It is a proxy for
the size of the bilateral trade relationship.This variable is never signicant
except in Column (2).
Column (2) of table 3 is very similar to Column (1) except that all the
explanatory variables are lagged by one period. Results are essentially un-
changed, except for nc
dt whose coecient becomes negative and signicant.
What that means is that more rm-product combinations from a given origin
to a given destination are associated with a lower probability of survival past
the rst year. Without making too much of this result, one can interpret it
as follows. Given that we include origin-destination xed eects, nc
dt picks
up only the time-variant component of bilateral shocks, like booms in the
destination market. The negative coecient suggests that a growth expan-
sion (a boom) in t   1 triggers crowding in followed by retrenchment.12
Column (3) introduces an additional regressor. The literature on multi-
product rms suggests that rms have core and marginal products, and that
they have a stronger competitive advantage in the former (see for instance
Eckel and Neary 2010 for a theoretical model and Iacovone, Rauch and Win-
ters 2010 for an empirical test of this hypothesis). For each multiproduct
rm f and product p, we proxy how close is that product from the rm's
`core' by lnzfp, the log of its share in the total rm's export sales. Results
suggest that it correlates positively with rst-year survival probability even
after controling for dollar initial value; that is, the probability of survival for
`core' products is substantially higher than for others. For instance, a prod-
uct representing 80% of the rm's export sales (all destinations together)
would have a rst-year survival probability on a given destination higher by
12Conrming this interpretation, when we exclude the destination xed eects, the
coecient on this variable becomes positive, suggesting that permanently more attractive
markets are associated with longer survival, which is consistent with our interpretation.
This \crowding-in" result is also consistent with a nding by Bussolo, Iacovone, and Molina
(2010) who found, using rm-level data from the Dominican Republic, that the reduction of
taris following the signature of CAFTA led to some over-crowding of Dominican exports,
followed by retrenchment.
2110 percentage points than a product representing 20% of the rm's export
sales.
In column (4) of table 3, we control for a potential omitted variable that
could bias our results if country c had a comparative advantage in product
p, explaining both that it had more exporters of that product (in destination
d or elsewhere) and that product p had a better survival outlook. As a
control for this, we use the initial (sample-start) value of Balassa's revealed









where vpc stands for country c's exports of product p and xpw for world ex-
ports of that good. Balassa's index measures the ratio of the share of product
p in country c's export basket relative to it share in the world's export bas-
ket. The higher it is, the more that country is revealed to have a comparative
advantage in that product. We compute it at HS6 from mean exports for
1999, 2000 and 2001. Results are robust to the inclusion of this control.
Finally, Column (5) provides a key test of whether our synergy eect is
spurrious by replacing it with a `placebo'. Namely, we replace lnnc
pdt, the
number of rms exporting the same product to the same destination from the
same country, by lnn
 c
pdt, the number of rms exporting the same product to
the same destination from other countries. For instance, consider an export
spell of boys' swimwear (HS611239) to Germany by a Senegalese rm. On
the right-hand side of the equation, instead of the number of other Sene-
galese rms exporting HS611239 to Germany, we will now have the number
of rms exporting HS611239 to Germany from other countries in our sam-
ple (Tanzania, Malawi and Mali). This variable may be positive or zero.
It may also be missing, as our national samples have some non-overlapping
years, so the sample size is substantially lower. It should also be kept in
mind that the placebo we are using is neither random nor \matched", being
dictated by data availability. It is thus not a rigorous counterfactual. Be
that as it may, whereas the synergy eect comes out very strongly in all
specications, whether pooled across countries (as reported in Table 3) or
run separately by country, the placebo eect is never signicant. This test
contributes to increase our condence that are \synergy eect" is not identi-
22fying some spurious correlation; it also suggests that there is some national
element in the synergy we identify (recall that regressions include bilateral
origin-destination xed eects).
4.3 Interpreting the synergy eect
4.3.1 Extended networks and \institutional production capabili-
ties"
We now turn to possible interpretations of the synergy eect that we iden-
tied. We rst explore if the synergy eect we identied in Table 3 carries
over to extended networks of exporters of \similar" products. This has the
advantage of reinforcing our attempt to lter out omitted-variable bias, as
extended networks at the industry level may pick up the eect of compara-
tive advantage, infrastructure, and intermediation channels in a more robust
way than Balassa indices calculated at the HS6 level do.
First, we dene a new regressor, which we will call HS4 for simplicity,
equal to the number of products other than p exported by rm f to des-
tination d and belonging to p's HS4 heading. Table 4 reports results with
HS4 added to the main specication. The new variable has a positive and
signicant eect on survival, but it does not aect the signicance or mag-
nitude of our synergy eect. In column (2), we interact this variable with
nc
pdt, the synergy eect. Again, the synergy eect itself remains positive and
signicant, but the coecient on the interaction term is negative. What this
means is that the more there are rms selling \similar" (same HS4 but dif-
ferent HS6) products, the less rm f is sensitive to the `network' of rms
selling the exact same product (at HS6)| intuitively networks of identical
and \similar" products are somewhat substitutes.
As an alternative, in column (3) we dene a new variable, HK, equal
to the weighted sum of the number of rms exporting product p to the
same destination d where the weights are equal to the `distance' between p
and p in the sense of Hausmann and Klinger (2006).13 This new variable
has no signicant eect on the probability of survival, but it does not af-
13Hausmann and Klinger's measure of proximity is essentially a measure of the proba-
bility that two goods are exported simultaneously by a country.
23Table 4: Extended networks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
nc
pdt 0.0551*** 0.0699*** 0.0607*** 0.0709***
(0.00364) (0.00624) (0.00300) (0.00362)
nfpt 0.151*** 0.151*** 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.00374) (0.00374) (0.00289) (0.00289)
nfdt 0.0322*** 0.0321*** 0.0305*** 0.0304***
(0.00112) (0.00112) (0.000916) (0.000915)
vfpdt 0.0414*** 0.0413*** 0.0375*** 0.0376***
(0.00199) (0.00198) (0.00166) (0.00165)
nc
dt -0.0170** -0.0178** 0.00101 0.00175









Observations 38451 38451 52212 52212
Note: Probit estimations, marginal eects reported. Origin-destination, HS2
and year xed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by origin-destination-
product.
fect it; interacted, in Column (4), the eect is, again, negative, suggesting
some substitutability between the networks of identical and \close" products.
In conclusion, in this subsection we evaluated the possibility that our
results could be driven not by the \synergy" eects due to the presence of
companies exporting same HS6 products to same destination but rather by
some \broader" extended networks. In the light of recent work of Hidalgo et
al (2007) we could be concerned that a key omitted variable driving our re-
sults is indeed the existence of some broader \institutional capabilities". For
this reason, we added to our baseline specications two new variable captur-
ing these potential \institutional capabilities" and found that, while indeed
24these are important and there seems to be some substitutability between
these and the \synergy eect", nevertheless the inclusion of these variables
does not alter our previous results.
4.3.2 Information and access to nance
We now turn to an exploration of the mechanisms that could explain our re-
sults, primarily focusing on the hypothesis that the \synergy eect" is driven
by the existence of some \information spillovers".
First, this synnergy eect could indicate the presence of information ex-
ternalities. For instance, when technical regulations or buyer policies change
in the destination market, exporters may share information about upcoming
changes, improving their ability to anticipate and adapt to these changes.
Alternatively, buyers may take suppliers from a given country more seriously
(and therefore share more information with them or show more exibility in
the face of glitches) when there is a critical mass of them and improve their
reliability. If this conjecture is correct, we should expect a stronger synergy
eect for products characterized by higher quality heterogeneity for which
information asymmetries between buyers and producers are potentially more
important. We proxy product p's quality heterogeneity by p, the coecient
of variation of its FOB unit value across exporters in 2000 (the initial value
in our sample) using COMTRADE data, with a higher p meaning more
heterogeneous quality.14 The results are presented in column (1) of Table 5.
The coecient on the interaction term p  lnnpdt is positive, although sig-
nicant only at the 10% level, suggesting that the synnergy eect is stronger
for products with a high unit-value dispersion, where information is more
important.
Given the importance of nance, as shown by the survey discussed in Sec-
tion 3, an alternative hypothesis could be that while information is still a key
determinant of the synergy eect the mechanism behind it could be instead
dierent. Consider the following scenario. A Senegalese rm is approached
by a US buyer to provide a small trial order of t-shirts. Upon successful
delivery and sale, the buyer is happy and contacts again the Senegalese rm
for a larger order. Now the Senegalese rm has to ramp up capacity and,
14We explored results on sub-samples split by Rauch's categories in a table that is
available upon request.
25Table 5: Mechanisms behind the synergy eect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
nc
pdt 0.0552*** 0.0512*** 0.0932*** 0.0455*** 0.0816***
(0.00437) (0.00496) (0.0112) (0.00577) (0.0121)
nfpt 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.138*** 0.132*** 0.137***
(0.00290) (0.00289) (0.00343) (0.00289) (0.00343)
nfdt 0.0375*** 0.0377*** 0.0369*** 0.0378*** 0.0370***
(0.00166) (0.00165) (0.00183) (0.00165) (0.00183)
vfpdt 0.0305*** 0.0307*** 0.0290*** 0.0307*** 0.0291***
(0.000916) (0.000918) (0.00104) (0.000918) (0.00104)
nc
dt 0.00110 0.00131 -0.00275 0.00142 -0.00234
(0.00585) (0.00585) (0.00635) (0.00585) (0.00635)
 -0.00610 -0.00641 -0.0194***
(0.00500) (0.00499) (0.00565)
p  nc












Obs. 52212 52212 37838 52212 37838
Note: Probit estimations, marginal eects reported. Origin-destination, HS2 and year
xed eects. Robust standard errors clustered by origin-destination-product.
26for that, it needs support from nancial institutions. But the nancial insti-
tutions may not take letters of credit from the buyer at face value, because
are aware of all sorts of glitches { quality or other { that may emerge down
the line. Anecdotal experience suggests that, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
banks' response will typically be `no' irrespective of the \proofs of protabil-
ity" that the exporter shows, and the trade relationship with the US buyer
will end before it had a chance to bear fruit. However, if several Senegalese
rms already sell t-shirts on the US market, the same nancial institutions
may be more easily convinced about the chances of success of this venture
and better evaluate the potential risks involved in this transaction. If this
scenario is representative, the synergy eect should be stronger for products
that are especially dependent on external nance than for others as initial
nancial constraints would be more binding in these sectors. In order to
test this conjecture we interact our variable identifying the synergy eect
with the measure of dependence from external nance proposed by Rajan
and Zingales (1998).15 We construct our rp variable at the product level by
using concordance tables between ISIC3 and HS6 classication, and assign-
ing to each HS product the Rajan-Zingales index of the ISIC code to which
that product belong. Column (2) of Table 5 shows that the interaction term
rp  lnnpdt is positive and signicant.
As an alternative way of getting a handle on the degree of dependence
from nance, we use a proxy for `asset tangibility' proposed by Braun (2003).16
The idea that rms with more tangible assets presents lower risks as these
provides real guarantees for bank loans, and information asymmetries (ad-
verse selection or moral hazard) are less important with good collateral, so
synnergy eects should play a lesser role. In accordance with this conjecture,
in column (3) of Table 5 we show that the interaction of asset tangibility (rp)
15Rajan and Zingales' measure of nancial dependence is an industry-level variable
calculated for 27 3-digits ISIC industries and nine 4-digits ones using compustat data for
the US. Let k be capital expenditure and x operational cash ow at the rm level. Rajan
and Zingales' index for industry j, rj, is the median value of (k x)=k across all compustat
rms in industry j. Index values, given in Table 1 of Rajan-Zingales (1998), range from
-0.45 for tobacco (ISIC 314) to 1.49 for drugs (ISIC 3522).
16Braun proxies asset tangibility by the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to
market value at the rm level, using US compustat data. The industry-level variable is
constructed, like in Rajan-Zingales, by taking the industry median at the ISIC 3-digit
level. Index values, given in Table 1 of Braun (2003), range from 0.09 (leather products)
to 0.67 (petroleum reneries).
27and the synergy eect has a negative and signicant coecient, implying that
rms belonging to industries with high asset tangibility (essentially capital-
intensive industries) are less sensitive to the synergy eect.17
Given that these interactions have signicant explanatory power, we com-
bine them to address a potential omitted variable bias, and to compare there
coecients in a joint multivariate regression. In columns (4) and (5) we
combine one regressors capturing each of the three hypothesis that these in-
teractions try to capture: information, nancial constraints or capabilities.
We nd that typically the same signs, magnitudes and statistical signicance
levels persist as the ones just discussed, and the interpretations from above
are valid when we control for all these eects simultaneously.
5 Concluding remarks
In spite of their growing interest for the profession, rm-level datasets are
still rare for low-income countries, and virtually inexistent for African coun-
tries. Our exploration of African customs data on rm-level exports revealed
a set of stylized facts that are consistent with evidence from previous studies
analyzing rich or middle-income countries. We showed that exporters in our
set of African countries experiment a lot on export markets, at a low scale
and with low survival rates, particularly in the rst year. That is, they op-
erate in a dicult environment characterized by very high \infant-mortality
rates". Therefore we investigate more in detail what determines if they sur-
vive beyond their rst year.
The most striking nding coming out of our analysis |and which could
not be observed on the product-level data used by previous studies of export
survival|is that exporters of similar goods to the same destination exert a
positive externality on new entrants. That is, the more they are, the higher
the survival probability of new entrants|although the eect is relatively
small. This nding is at rst sight surprising, as one might expect that ex-
porters of a given product to the same destination may crowd out each other,
either through price competition or simply by oering more choice to buy-
17Similarly as done for the proxy of external dependence borrowed from Rajan and
Zingales, we construct the asset-tangibility variable at the product level, p, by assigning
to that product the corresponding ISIC3 value of Braun's index.
28ers who could them `hop' from one to the other, reducing survival rates at
the individual level. Strikingly, the synergy eect disappears if we measure
the network as the number of rms exporting the same product from other
origin countries from our dataset. That is, the synergy eect is truly national.
Various conjectures could explain our result. First, it could be driven
by omitted-variable bias (e.g. supportive infrastructure at the national level
or comparative advantage). We control for this by including the country's
revealed-comparative advantage index as a regressor, without altering the
results. Relatedly, we follow the idea developed in various papers by Haus-
mann and Klinger (2006) that product-specic capabilities explain success
in export markets and investigate if our synergy eect disappears when con-
trolling for some proxies of these \production capabilities", which would be
more likely to be driven by omitted variables. Again, our results are robust,
although we also nd that synergy eects and production capabilities appear
to be substitutes for each other.
Finally, we explore various conjectures drawing on information asymme-
tries and access to nance. For instance, access to credit may be easier when
many exporters of the same product from the same origin simultaneously op-
erate in the same destination, as larger numbers may provide signals about
protability to both new entrants as well as nancing institutions. First, our
hypothesis is that an exporter may obtain precious information through the
network of competitors, potential buyers, relatives or friends involved in the
same manufacturing activity and exporting to the same market. Second, our
hypothesis is that an isolated exporter might have more diculties convinc-
ing the nancial institutions that the risks she faces are manageable given
the uncertain environment of export relations. If other rms are success-
fully in operation, by contrast, the nancial institution can use the success
of others as a predictor of its client's potential. We verify these conjectures
in dierent ways. First, we interact the synergy eect with quality hetero-
geneity (proxied by the cross-country dispersion in unit values at the product
level). Second, we interact it with indicators of dependence on bank nance
and asset structure (as a measure of the scope for moral hazard). In both
cases, interaction terms are positive and strongly signicant, suggesting that
synergy eects are stronger in sectors where informational asymmetries are
higher, and dependence on external nance is more intense.
29Our results are suggestive of a potential market failure if exporters fail to
internalize the positive externality that they exert on new entrants. This may
be taken as an argument in support of government-sponsored export promo-
tion. However, policy implications should be interpreted very cautiously,
as the record of export promotion in developing countries is highly uneven.
In addition it may well be that exporters could internalize the externality
through mutual-support professional organizations.
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346 Appendix 1
This survey was conducted over a sample of exporters randomly drawn from
the customs data in each country, after applying some pre-established guide-
lines that took into account the following criteria:
 exporting status of the rm,
 its size,
 its location
 the economic sector (at the 2-digit level of the HS Code)
In particular, all the exporters in each country were classied in four
groups according to the evolution of their exporting status: a) regular ex-
porters are those exporters with consecutive exports until 2008 (last year
covered by the customs data in all four countries), b) past exporters are the
exporters who were exporting consecutively for at least two years and then
exited the market before 2008, c) intermittent exporters are those who ex-
ported erratically during the period included in the sample and nally, d)
new exporters are those exporters who appear for the rst time in the sample
in 2008.
Over 200 rms were contacted in each country; however, due to low coop-
eration and identication problems with some of the rms, the nal sample
by country and exporting group is as follows:
Country Intermit New Reg Past Total
Mwi 9 9 59 14 91
Mli 10 18 48 22 98
Sen 15 25 43 39 122
Tza 15 7 48 14 84
Total 49 59 198 89 395
35Table 6: Survey Responses on Importance of Networks (in %)
Question 1: First time exporters: How was the contact with the rst client made?
MLI MWI SEN TZA All
Research online 14 11 24 35 21
Third party contact 73 68 77 51 67
Competitors' network 8 12 24 11 14
Trade Fair 20 12 19 34 21
Export Promotion Agency 12 11 5 13 10
Exporters' Association 9 7 8 8 8
Another channel 16 24 5 11 14
Question 2: If the company looked for its buyers, how did it approach them?
Research online 26 31 29 41 32
Third party contact 74 72 76 57 70
Competitors' network 19 18 23 21 20
Trade Fair 40 35 28 52 39
Export Promotion Agency 18 19 11 21 17
Exporters' Association 14 5 6 17 11
Another channel 10 20 15 6 13
Question 3: If the buyers approached the company, how did they approach it?
Company's website 22 30 29 53 33
Old clients of the company 25 28 33 32 30
Third-party contacts 62 75 75 66 69
Competitors' network 14 28 21 26 22
Trade Fair 34 33 20 55 35
Export Promotion Agency 18 21 7 25 18
Another channel 9 22 15 8 13
Question 4: How did the opportunity to export a new product come about?
An existing buyer approached the company 54 46 50 68 54
The company saw saw demand in a buyers' market 33 46 50 56 46
The company saw successful competitors 17 27 13 32 22
Success with selling the product domestically 38 42 44 68 48
Through a third party 46 23 25 35 32
Any other type of opportunity? 17 19 13 6 14
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